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RESCHEDULING As THE GROUNDWORK FOR
SECONDARY MARKETS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT
Ross P. BUCKLEY*
§ 1 INTRODUCTION
The secondary market in the debt of less developed countries
(LDC), now known as the "emerging markets', has been newsworthy
throughout the 1990s because of its explosive growth 2 and the profit-
ability of some investments in these markets.3 However, few people
appreciate how the strategy of repeated reschedulings in the 1980s laid
the groundwork for the subsequent rapid development of this market.
This little known role of reschedulings is the focus of this article.
The first response of international commercial banks to the debt
crisis in 1982 was to reschedule the current debt of LDCs. Fresh loans
were extended to permit the payment of interest upon the rescheduled
debt.4 This remained the standard response throughout the 1980s and
received the imprimatur of the U.S. government in the Baker Plan.5
1. Associate Professor of Law, Bond University. While all responsibility remains
mine, I would like to thank Michael Chamberlin and Jonathon Murno of the Emerging
Markets Traders Association for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2. The market existed in nascent form before the debt crisis but really started to
grow after 1982. In 1983, market volume was, in the absence of accurate figures, ap.
proximately $500 -700 million face value debt. In 1984, total volume had risen to an es-
timated $2-2.5 billion. In the Spotlight, BANKNOTES 8 (providing an interview with Mar-
tin Schubert). By 1990, turnover had reached $100 billion; and by 1996, due to the
conversion of most loans into Brady bonds, turnover was equivalent to $5,300 billion. See
Brian O'Reilly, Cooling Down the World Debt Bomb, FORTUNE, May 20, 1991, at 123, 124;
Voorhees, Doses of Reality, 40 LATIN FINANCE 19, 26 (1992); cf. NMB Postbank - leading
the field, IFR REVIEW OF THE YEAR (supp. 1990) at 78, (stating an estimate of $75 billion).
The 1996 figure is from Emerging Markets Traders Association, 1996 DEBT TRADING
VOLUME SURVEY (March 17, 1997).
3. Emerging Market Debts Extend Gains in U.S., REUTERS NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 4,
1996, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
4. While the scale of debt restructurings in the 1980s was unprecedented, sovereign
debt restructurings themselves were not new. Between 1956 and 1974 eleven nations re-
scheduled a total of $7 billion of debt in thirty restructurings. From 1975 to 1981, four-
teen nations rescheduled a further $10 billion of debt in twenty-five separate restructur-
ings. See CHANDRA H. HARDY, RESCHEDULING DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBTS, 1956-1981:
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (1982); see also Peter H. Lindert, Response to Debt
Crisis: What is Different About the 1980s, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 238 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989).
5. In October 1985, at the joint meeting of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank in Seoul, South Korea, U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker announced his
"Program for Sustained Growth" for highly indebted nations. The program, dubbed the
"Baker Plan," became the nucleus of the U.S. government debt policy for the next three
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§ 2 A TYPICAL RESCHEDULING PACKAGE
A regular pattern for rescheduling6 soon formed in 1983. 7 The first
step in most reschedulings of commercial bank debt was to establish a
steering committee to act as an advisory group and have a liaison with
all bank creditors. The members of this committee were usually the
major money-centre banks.8 The steering committees required the
debtor to complete, or enter into, a rescheduling of its official debts.
The term "official debts" refers to debts to other governments 9 or inter-
national institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary
Fund [hereinafter IMF].I0
years. See Jeffrey Carmichael, The Debt Crisis: Where Do We Stand After Seven Years?,4
RESEARCH OBSERVER 121, 125 (July 1989). The plan proposed substantial new loans from
commercial banks and official agencies tied to policy reforms in the debtor nations. The
Baker Plan aimed to defeat the debt crisis through long-term growth in the debtor nations
(as opposed to the short-term stabilization programs of the preceding three years). In
Secretary Baker' s words, "increased financing not only will ease current debt servicing
difficulties, but will facilitate and support domestic policy changes to increase economic
growth." Morris Goldman, Confronting Third World Debt: The Baker and Bradley Plans,
559 THE BACKGROUNDER 6 (January 22, 1987). However, neither the commercial banks
nor the official agencies came close to lending the targeted amounts of fresh funds (Cline,
supra p. 87-88). Perhaps, the most important aspect of the plan was the explicit acknowl-
edgment by the governments of the developed world that a solution to the debt crisis re-
quired their involvement. RICHARD A. DEBS, DAVID L. ROBERTS & ELI M. REMOLONA,
FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES - ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE - DEBT SWAPS
13 (1987).
6. See Steven M. Cohen, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin Ameri-
can Debt Revolution, 10:1 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 97 (1988) (stating that the regular pat-
tern was modeled on the Mexican procedures).
7. The pattern formed quickly, as much out of the power of precedent (especially
when everything was so rushed), as out of any careful analysis that the form of the re-
schedulings was the best possible; see Mark A. Walker & Lee C. Buchheit, Legal Issues in
the Restructuring of Commercial Bank Loans to Sovereign Borrowers, in INTERNATIONAL
BORROWING: NEGOTIATING AND STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS 459,
459-60 (D. Bradlow ed., 1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL BORROWING].
8. A major tension in the rescheduling years was that the minor creditors became
increasingly convinced over time that the steering committees, comprised as they were of
banks heavily committed to the debtor nations, did not properly represent their interests
and were in a position of conflict of interest. See Robert D. Sloan, The Third World Debt
Crisis: Where We Have Been and Where We Are Going, WASH. Q., Winter 1988, at 103.
9. Including, for instance, debts to the trade finance authorities of such governments
like the Export-Import Bank in the U.S. or the Export Credit Guarantee Department in
the U.K. The rescheduling of official debts is handled through the "Paris Club" (which is
named after its usual place of meeting and was first formed in 1956 for the consolidation
and renegotiation of Argentina 's trade debts and supplier credits). The Paris Club has
no fixed membership, no office and no permanent administrative staff. Its members con-
sist of the major creditors of the nation whose request for rescheduling is under consid-
eration. Karen Hudes, Co-ordination of Paris and London Club Reschedulings, chap 17A
in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING, at 451.
10. Trade finance and interbank credit lines were usually expressly maintained and
not rescheduled. See Lee Buchheit, Alternative Techniques in Sovereign Debt Restructur-
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The second step of most steering committees was to require the
country to implement, or enter into, an economic program designed by
the IMF." The IMF conditioned its loans upon reformation of domestic
economic policy in a process which became known as "structural ad-
justment."
12
In addition to rescheduling official debts and adherence to the
structural adjustment program, the other elements of a typical re-
scheduling included:
(a)new commercial bank loans, usually with a grace period on in-
terest repayments of between two and four years;
1 3
(b)new IMF loans for a three year period; 14 and
(c)the rescheduling of existing commercial bank loans over longer
maturities and with substantial grace periods on capital repayments. 15
From the beginning, loans were grouped for rescheduling based on
their due dates. For instance, all $4.8 billion of Brazilian loans due in
1983 were rescheduled in one agreement. 16 From 1982 to 1984, debts
falling due in the next year were generally rescheduled together.
7
ing, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1988).
11. Jeffrey Sachs, Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY 24 (J. Sachs ed., 1989). Soon after the crisis broke the IMF stepped into the
role of economic overseer for debtor nations seeking a rescheduling. The commercial
banks had firm views on the need for economic austerity by debtor countries but consid-
erations of national sovereignty made direct commercial bank involvement in the eco-
nomic policies of debtors a political impossibility. As an international institution, the IMF
was able to play this supervisory role, but only at the cost of much resentment from
within the debtor nations. Lee C. Buchheit, Comity, Act of State, and the International
Debt Crisis: Is There an Emerging Legal Equivalent of Bankruptcy Protection for Nations?,
79 AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L. L. PROC. 126, 135 (1985).
12. "Structural adjustment" was a "stunningly bland name." See DUNCAN GREEN,
SILENT REVOLUTION - THE RISE OF MARKET ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 11 (1995)
(discussing policies with a stunningly high human cost). See WALDON F. BELLO, DARK
VICTORY: THE UNITED STATES, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND GLOBAL POVERTY (1994);
Jerry Dohnal, Structural Adjustment Programs: A Violation of Rights, 1 AUST J. HUM.
RIGHTS 57 (1994); SUSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT (1988).
13. David Suratgar, The International Financial System and the Management of the
International Debt Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL BORROWING - NEGOTIATING AND
STRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL DEBT TRANSACTIONS, 459, 493,494 (Daniel D. Bradlow ed.,
1986). Considerable pressure from the IMF and the central banks of the commercial
banks, home countries often had to be brought to bear to persuade the commercial banks
to "voluntarily" make these new loans.
14. Id. at 495 (indicating that the IMF funds were typically only a fraction of the new
money extended by the commercial banks).
15. Id.
16. Robert Pastor, The Debt Crisis: A Financial or a Development Problem, in LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNNING FOR THE FUTURE 12 (Rob-
ert Pastor ed., 1987).
17. Id. at 12, see tbl 1.3. Occasionally, in this period, debts falling due in the next two
years were rescheduled together.
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However, these annual reschedulings were burdensome and by 1984-
1985 the trend was to negotiate multi-year rescheduling agreements.' 8
Accordingly, all of Mexico's loans due from 1985 to 1990 were resched-
uled in one agreement. 19
New money to facilitate interest payments accompanied most of the
reschedulings. The title "new money loans" is misleading since the
money never reached the debtors but went directly to their accounts
with the lending banks.2 0 In reality, the new money was a method of
capitalizing interest payments in advance. 21 It was usually less than
the forthcoming interest payments and as a result the net transfer of
resources was in favor of the banks.2 2 Fresh capital to support economic
development in the region was virtually non-existent in the 1980s.
In the early debt reschedulings, the banks demanded a substantial
premium to compensate for the high risks of such lending. As a result,
rescheduling increased the financial burden on the debtors. The aver-
age interest rate was the LIBOR23 plus 2.2 percent 24 and generous fees
averaged 1.2 percent of the loan.2
5
As the cycle of reschedulings continued, both the interest rates and
fees were progressively reduced. By 1984 the average margin over
LIBOR was 1.77 percent and average fees were 0.8 percent. 26 Later
still, the Mexican rescheduling of 1987 set a new low standard for inter-
est rates at 13/16 th over LIBOR.27 Banks had finally learned that
higher premiums created higher risks by increasing the burden on
debtors.
28
18. Implementation of multi-year restructurings began in 1984. See Lee Buchheit,
You 'II Never Eat Lunch in This Conference Room Again, 1988 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 11
(1988). (indicating that these restructurings had, then unrecognized, subsequently sub-
stantial benefits for the secondary market). See also UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSNATIONAL BANK BEHAVIOR AND THE
INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 15 (1989) [hereinafter ECLAC/CTC].
19. The amount rescheduled was $48.7 billion. See Pastor, supra note 16. See also
Buchheit, supra note 11, at 132 (considering multi-year restructurings).
20. Sachs, supra note 11, at 26.
21. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 18, at 114.
22. SACHS, supra note 11, at 10.
23. LIBOR is an acronym for the London Interbank Offered Rate and represents the
cost of banks funding themselves in the London interbank market.
24. Pastor, supra note 16, at 11.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Sloan, supra note 8, at 109.
28. See Hossein Askari, Third World Debt and Financial Innovation: The Experience
of Chile and New Mexico 21 (1991).
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§ 3 THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THE RESCHEDULINGS
From the outset some believed that rescheduling was a placebo that
would never solve the debt problem. 29 Most, however, believed that by
buying time the debtor nations could trade their way out of their prob-
lems. 30 Time did significantly ameliorate the problem for the banks. 31
As the 1980s progressed, the borrowers kept servicing their debts and
the banks kept booking the profits from these massive loans. 32 The
banks accumulated reserves and increased their primary capital
33 so
that by the end of the decade a default would not have threatened the
solvency of most banks. Indeed, one could characterize the entire
thrust of the debt restructurings of the 1980s as an attempt to prevent
a massive shakeout in the international financial system. As a senior
official in the General Accounting Office said in 1989, "we believe that
the efforts up until recently - all the restructurings... were measures
to get us from there to here without crashing the banking system."
34
In contrast, time did nothing but worsen the economic plight of the
borrowers. 35 As Carlos Marichal wrote in 1989:
Repayment of the debts has meant enormous sacrifices for the peo-
ples of Latin America. At the urging of the bankers and the officials of
29. Pastor, supra note 16, at 11.
30. Id. Many believed in late 1982 and 1983 that the crisis was one of short-term li-
quidity, not solvency. See, e.g., CARLOS MARICHAL, A CENTURY 0 F DEBT CRISIS IN LATIN
AMERICA 239 (1989) (indicating that rescheduling was an entirely appropriate response to
the problem).
31. Sloan, supra note 8, at 103-11.
32. Indeed, with the exception of Bank America, the net income of the nine largest
U.S. banks continued to rise throughout the period from 1982 to 1986, while the debt cri-
sis was imperiling the very existence of many of these major banks it was also, ironically,
enhancing their short-term profitability. See ECLAC/CTC, supra note 18, at 61.
33. The nine largest US commercial banks nearly doubled their capital from $29 bil-
lion in 1982 to $55.8 billion in 1988. The ratio of the Latin American exposure of these
nine banks to their capital decreased from 176.5% to 83.6% over the same period. See
Atsushi Masuda, Mexico's Debt Reduction Agreement and the New Debt Strategy, 11
EXIM. REV. 26, 36-37 (1991).
34. Testimony of Dr. Allen Mendelowitz, Director of the Trade, Energy and Finance
Division of the General Accounting Office, before the International Banking Subcommit-
tee, Federal News Service (June 27, 1989) p. 9 of 32 pages of testimony.
35. In Latin America, real GDP per capita fell dramatically in the 1980s and the net
capital flow was substantially in favor of the developed world. See Jesus Silva-Herzog,
The Costs for Latin America 's Development, in LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS, supra note
16, at 35; Harold James, Deep Red: The International Debt Crisis and its Historical Prece-
dents, in AMERICAN SCHOLAR, Summer 1987, at 331, 340; see also Askari, supra note 28,
at 19. On the effect of the rescheduling years on Latin America, see Carmichael, supra
note 5 at 139; Rudiger Dornbusch, in DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD
ECONOMY, supra note 11, at 310; Lindert, supra note 4, at 262-63; and Sloan, supra note
8, at 111. In sub-Saharan Africa, where most debt was to official lenders, the situation
was even more dire: See Abbey, Growing out of debt - the African problem, in THIRD
WORLD DEBT: MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES (Stephany Griffith-Jones ed., 1989).
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the International Monetary Fund, governments have imposed painful
austerity programs on their citizens. . . to extract sufficient revenue for
paying foreign debts. These programs have led to... a sharp deteriora-
tion in basic living standards. Despite these sacrifices, there has been a
steady worsening of the economic situation in most countries... [and]
record levels of unemployment intensify the misery and discontent. 36
Neither did more time help matters. As Duncan Green wrote in
1995:
An investment collapse has left the region burdened with a crum-
bling infrastructure of potholed roads, electricity blackouts and water
shortages which will take decades to make good.... In human terms,
the failure has been far more profound ... terrible damage [has been
inflicted] on the poor. By 1993, 60 million more Latin Americans had
been driven below the poverty line, bringing the total to nearly half of
the population.
37
The debt crisis has been, primarily, a financial problem in the
West. In Latin America it has long been a political and social issue to
provide sufficient food, adequate shelter and basic healthcare. 38
§ 4 RESCHEDULING AND THE SECONDARY MARKET
However, while the direct effects of rescheduling and the accompa-
nying structural adjustment programs on the debtor nations were ad-
verse in the extreme, the indirect effects of rescheduling were more
positive. The rescheduling process facilitated the growth of the secon-
dary market for LDC debt and the secondary market in turn eased the
burden on debtor nations. The market benefited the debtors by first
permitting formal and informal debt buy-backs 39 which, when secon-
dary market prices were as low as 20 percent of the face value, were a
particularly good investment of foreign exchange for debtor nations.40
36. See MARICHAL, supra note 30, at 237; see also Wade Mansell, Legal Aspects of In-
ternational Debt, 18 J.L. AND SOC'Y 381 at 388-90 (1991). The burden of the rescheduling
years has fallen mostly upon the very poorest people in the debtor nations.
37. Duncan Green, Hidden Fist Hits the Buffers, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Oct. 1995,
at 35; see also CARLOS CASTANEDA, UTOPIA UNARMED 5 (1993) (stating that "[d]uring the
1980s and through the beginning of the 1990s, the hemisphere suffered its worst economic
and social crisis since the Depression. In 1980, 120 million Latin Americans, or 39 per-
cent of the area' s population, lived in poverty; by 1985 the number had grown to 160-170
million; toward the end of the decade it was estimated at the appalling figure of 240 mil-
lion").
38. Political demonstrations in Latin America in the late 1980s and in Africa to this
day are commonplace in protesting the harsh conditions imposed by servicing the foreign
loans. See MARICHAL, supra note 30, at 237-239; Dohnal, supra note 12, at 68.
39. As their name implies, debt buy-backs involve the acquisition of the debt by or on
behalf of the debtor either directly from the creditors or through the secondary market.
40. Buy-backs came in many forms in the 1980s, including official programs operated
by the debtor governments in Brazil, Chile and elsewhere. Another important form was
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Second, the market made necessary 4' and facilitated42 the Brady Plan
which brought with it an element of debt relief.
Growth of the Secondary Market
The rescheduling process supported the growth of the secondary
market by: (1) replacing a multiplicity of debtors with one debtor; (2)
consolidating the indebtedness in a handful of agreements; and (3)
standardizing the transfer provisions in those agreements.
[1] The Replacement of Many Debtors With One
In most rescheduling agreements, and the accompanying new
money agreements, the debtor was the sovereignty. Occasionally, the
debtor would be the nation's central bank and the sovereign would be
the guarantor. In either case, all the loans would thereafter trade at
the one price based on the sovereign's credit. Without rescheduling,
trading this debt in the secondary market would have required knowl-
edge of the creditworthiness of hundreds of different borrowers. For in-
stance, in Mexico alone there were over 50 borrowers before 1982, the
the repurchase of private sector debt by Latin American corporations. For instance, be-
tween 1983 and 1988, Mexican corporations almost halved their level of indebtedness
from $22.3 billion to $14.5 billion principally through buy-backs. In Brazil, these private
buy-backs were often initiated by a foreign investor who would enter into an agreement
with a local company that the company would redeem its foreign debt in local currency
when the debt was acquired and tendered to it by the foreign investor. It has been esti-
mated that $3 billion of Brazilian debt was discharged in this manner in 1988. See,
Comments of Rudiger Dornbusch on the article by Bulow and Rogoff, The Buyback Boon-
doggle, 1988 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 675 at 699. With hindsight,
debt buy-backs proved to be the principal source of debt relief for Latin American debtors
in the 1980s and the most effective method of debt reduction available. For a more de-
tailed analysis of the role of buy-backs, see Buckley, Debt Exchanges Revisited - Lessons
from Latin America for Eastern Europe, Nw. J. INT'L L. & REV. (forthcoming May 1998).
41. The market made the Brady Plan necessary by enabling some regional U.S. and
continental European banks to dispose of their LDC debt portfolios in the late 1980s.
These banks were able to do this because their exposures were usually relatively small,
their loan loss provisions relatively large, and their capital relatively healthy. This led to
a breakdown in creditor solidarity as these banks began to refuse to participate in the ex-
tensions of new money which accompanied each restructuring under the Baker Plan.
This unraveling of the Baker Plan made necessary a new approach.
42. The secondary market in loans facilitated the Brady Plan in four ways: (i) the
market provided the prototype (as the relevant parties could see the loans trading like
bonds each day, it was a small step to conceive of their securitisation into bonds); (ii) the
market provided a secondary market for the bonds; (iii) the market established there was
investor appetite for such securities; (iv) the market discounts afforded a strong argument
for debt relief. The combined effect of these four factors was so significant that without
the secondary market the Brady Plan may have been too large a step into the unknown to
attract the support of the U.S. Treasury and, without the support of, and strong persua-
sion of bankers by, the U.S. Treasury, the Brady Plan would not have come to pass.
1998
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great majority consisting of private sector corporations. 43 The range of
prices, the need to know the credit of each separate borrower, and the
lack of fungibility between separate loans made to borrowers in the one
country would each have complicated and reduced the volume of trad-
ing in this market.
Another effect of rescheduling had significant advantages for the
architects of the process. The leader banks,44 as the dominant members
of the steering committees for the reschedulings, devised and directed
this rescheduling process and thereby obtained advantages which are
not widely appreciated. The leader banks had generally been the most
adventurous group of lenders in the 1970s and had "tended to depend
on income from special deals with riskier clients willing to pay higher
fees, commissions and interest to gain market access."45 These "riskier
clients" were usually private sector borrowers of marginal creditworthi-
ness. In the reschedulings the leader banks often improved their secu-
rity after the fact by converting their private sector loans into resched-
uled sovereign loans. 46 The challenger and follower banks had a higher
proportion of their exposure to more creditworthy debtors such as the
sovereigns and major parastatals and, thus, benefited much less than
the leaders from this rescheduling process.
47
43. UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, DEBT EQUITY
CONVERSIONS - A GUIDE FOR DECISION MAKERS 18 (1990). Admittedly, the borrowers of
the largest amounts by far were the sovereign and parastatals, like Pemex.
44. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carribbean
& United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations identified three groups of lend-
ers, leaders, challengers and followers, as follows: (i) The "leader" banks were all United
States banks and essentially dominated syndicated lending in the 1970's (Chase Manhat-
tan, BankAmerica, J.P. Morgan and Manufacturers Hanover); (ii) the "challenger" banks
were from North America, Europe and Japan and competed aggressively with the leaders
for the lending busines (Lloyds, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Tokyo, Bankers Trust, Chemi-
cal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto Dominion, Commerzbank Bank of
Nova Scotia and Long Term Credit Bank of Japan); (iii) the "follower" banks were all
non-U.S. and had a strong interest in lending to the region without being as aggressive as
the leaders and challengers (National Westminster, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Dresdner,
West Deutsche LB, Royal Bank of Canada, Midland Bank, Credit Lyonnais, Industrial
Bank of Japan and Banque Nationale de Paris) ECLAC/CTC, supra note 18.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 14-15 & 59-61. In the words of the U.N. study, at 61, "it seems that the
leaders used their domination of the bank steering committees to gain particular advan-
tage in terms of greater security for their more risky exposure and an improved income
stream from fees and punitive interest rates".
47. The standard theoretical reason given by the leader banks for requiring the sov-
ereign guarantee of all outstanding foreign indebtedness, both private and public, was
that upon the onset of the debt crisis most debtor governments took control of all foreign
exchange in their economy by requiring private sector entities to sell their foreign ex-
change to the Central Bank. If the government wished to centralize control of foreign ex-
change, the creditors argued, then the government must also assume responsibility for
the repayment of all indebtedness incurred in that nation. The practical reason given by
the leader banks was less subtle - if the government wanted the creditor' s cooperation
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[2] The Consolidation of Indebtedness in Fewer Agreements
Without rescheduling, the mechanics of secondary market trading
would have been difficult. The transferability of the loans was the
product of contract- each loan agreement had a provision which regu-
lated whether and how the obligation was transferable. Before re-
scheduling, the indebtedness of the 1970s was recorded in thousands of
lengthy loan agreements and trading the debt would have required ac-
cess to, and knowledge of, these agreements. The research required for
each transfer would have substantially slowed trading and substan-
tially increased the related legal costs. These difficulties were high-
lighted in 1993-94 when Russian debt began to be actively traded in the
secondary market. 48 The Russian loans had not been rescheduled and
their trading posed many problems. In the words of a trader, "These
loans were never meant to be traded.. . . There is [not] the ... degree of
commonality between all the loans that you found with Latin American
debt."49 That degree of commonality was a direct product of the re-
scheduling process.
The adoption of multi-year rescheduling agreements and compen-
dious new money agreements for Latin American debt in the resched-
uling years dramatically reduced the number of agreements which evi-
denced and governed the debt. For most nations, by 1988 the majority
of their debt which was tradable in this market was to be found in a
handful of rescheduling agreements and two or three new money
agreements.50 For instance, in Mexico by 1988, the multiplicity of loan
agreements with over 50 borrowers had been reduced to a handful of re-
structuring agreements and a similar number of new money agree-
ments5 1 with Mexico the borrower or guarantor in each. Accordingly,
traders and their legal advisers had to understand only a relatively
small number of agreements to be equipped to trade all of Mexico's out-
standing loans.
52
[3] The Standardization of the Transfer Provisions
Of all the standard clauses contained in sovereign loan agreements,
the secondary market was principally concerned with the proper identi-
on the rescheduling of public sector debts, then it must cooperate by assuming its private
sector' s exposure. See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN EXTERNAL DEBT
MANAGEMENT 8 (1995).
48. Russia: trading needs simplified, 1017 IFR 42, Feb 12, 1994. Russian debt has
since been securitised in a Brady-style rescheduling.
49. Id.
50. See Pastor, supra note 16, see table 1.3 at 12.
51. Id.
52. Id. (indicating that each of these agreements had essentially identical transfer
provisions).
1998
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fication of the tranche of debt being sold, the interest rate and the
transfer/assignment clause. Reschedulings meant that the trans-
fer/assignment clauses became relatively quickly standardized for most
of a country's indebtedness. Furthermore, certain clauses were adopted
in the restructuring agreements of more than one country-and this fur-
ther standardized matters.5 3 The explanation for this trend is simple.
5 4
The community of lawyers actively engaged in sovereign debt restruc-
turings was quite small. 55 It was common for one firm to act in a num-
ber of reschedulings, often simultaneously.5 6 Naturally, the documents
from the previous transaction were used as precedents for the latest re-
scheduling and the transfer/assignment clause was rarely the subject of
much negotiation. The form offered up by the lawyers for the creditors
would often survive untouched in the final agreement.
5 7
The standardization of the transfer provisions greatly facilitated
the secondary market's trading of these loans. After lawyers had
drafted a standard assignment agreement, the documentation of day-to-
day transactions could be handled by supervised paralegals and thus
legal costs were greatly reduced. Without widespread debt reschedul-
ing, the number of loan agreements with various transfer provisions
would have required an attorney's input for each assignment.
5 8
53. For instance, the transfer provision was in substance identical in each of (i) the
$3,700,000,000 1985 Term Credit Agreement dated as of August 1, 1985 among the Banco
Central de la Republica Argentina as Borrower, the Republic of Argentina as Guarantor,
Citibank NA as Agent, and others; and (ii) the New Restructure Agreement dated as of
August 29, 1985, among the United Mexican States as Obligor, Banco de Mexico as the
Central Bank of the United Mexican States, and others. Furthermore, the same provision
saw service again, this time with a simple addendum as to participation under the In-
creased Costs Clause in both (a) the Restructuring Agreement dated as of December 16,
1986 among the Republic of Chile as Obligor, Compagnie Luxembourgeoise AG -
Dresdner Bank International as Servicing Bank and others; and (b) the $925,000,000
Credit Agreement dated as of May 20, 1985 among the Central Bank of the Philippines as
Borrower, the Republic of the Philippines as Guarantor, Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Company as Agent and others.
54. As stressed by those closely involved in the process, "it would be incorrect to sup-
pose that any trend toward an increasing standardization of the documentation for sover-
eign debt restructuring results entirely from a considered and rational judgment....
There [is] a more human explanation for this phenomena": Walker & Buchheit, supra
note 7, at 459-60. The explanation is the power of precedents. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 460 (stating that the one firm, however, would usually only act for either
creditors or debtors in each of the restructurings in which it was involved).
57. See Peider Konz, The Third World Debt Crisis, 12 HASTINGS INT' L & COMP. L.
REV. 527 at 532 (1989) (stating that "concrete experience has shown... that sovereign
borrowers have often given too little autonomous thought to some of the key provisions of
loan or loan restructuring agreements").
58. The standardization of transfer procedures and documentation was further as-
sisted by the work of the Emerging Markets Traders Association which produced stan-
dard form trade confirmations for many classes of asset (see Emerging Markets Associa-
tion 1994 Annual Report at 9), a standard loan assignment (see Standard Terms for
RESCHEDULING FOR SECONDARY MARKETS
§ 5 CONCLUSION
Rescheduling replaced the numerous debtors in less developed
country with a single debtor.59 It replaced the hundreds of loan agree-
ments which evidenced the foreign indebtedness of most nations with
typically less than ten. Often it replaced the wide variety of transfer
provisions in those loan agreements with only one or two provisions. In
short, the rescheduling process created a legal environment in which
the debts of one country were almost fungible, i.e. the terms governing
all of one nation's indebtedness were so similar that most creditors were
indifferent as to which particular agreement governed the indebtedness
they were to sell or buy. 60 The necessary groundwork had been laid for
an efficient secondary market.6 1
Assignment of Loan Assets, April 15, 1996 (copy on file with the author) and Emerging
Markets Traders Association 1995 Annual Report at 11), and a netting facility (see Emerg-
ing Markets Traders Association 1994 Annual Report at 9). Over time, the netting facility
matured in 1995 into Match-EM, an instantaneous matching system for the confirmation
and settlement of trades (see Emerging Markets Traders Association 1996 Annual Report
at 5) and ultimately, in 1997, into the Emerging Markets Clearing Corporation (see
Emerging Markets Trading Association 1996 Annual Report at 9-10).
59. Or two, if one is technical and distinguishes cases in which the sovereign is debtor
from those in which the central bank is debtor and the sovereign is guarantor - the sec-
ondary market made no such distinction.
60. An exception was when, under some debt-equity schemes, only certain indebted-
ness was eligible for conversion into equity.
61. Whether the market was efficient in an economic sense is a separate issue; see
generally Suk Hun Lee et. al., The Behavior of Secondary Market Prices of LDC Syndi-
cated Loans, 20 J. BANKING & FINANCE 537 (1996).
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